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I.
INTRODUCTION
This appeal involves the second of two lawsuits in the District Court of Weber
County between American Interstate Mortgage Corporation, an Oregon corporation
(AIM), and James, Helen, and/or Bruce Edwards (the Edwards) over attempts by AIM to
judicially or nonjudicially foreclose its trust deed upon the home and real property in
South Ogden, Utah, that the Edwards acquired pursuant to a sheriffs sale.
In the first action, the District Court denied AIM the right to foreclose, finding that
it had filed to comply with the notice and cure provisions of its own trust deed note. The
court further denied AIM its requested attorney fees, late fees, interest, and other relief,
holding that AIM was by its "own conduct precluded as a matter of equity from receiving
the substantial sums" that it sought. No appeal was takenfromthat decision which
denied AIM $19,930.20 in attorney fees and related costs. Rather than seek appellate
relief, AIM has brought this, the second lawsuit, again seeking to recover the same
attorney fees that it was denied in the first suit.
At trial, the District Court initially ruled that AIM's claim for attorney fees in the
prior litigation was barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel as to
Bruce Edwards, but later allowed this claim when the property owners, James and Helen
Edwards were substituted as defendants in place of their son and property agent, Bruce.
Further, the trial court determined that it was no defense to the Edwards, as owners of the
property, that AIM had not furnished the notices specifically required under the terms of
1

the promissory note and trust deed as prerequisites to incurring attorney fees and court
costs and for accelerating the maturity of the principal due under the note. The type of
notices required under the contract documents were never given by the lender to the
original borrower, the assignee of the borrower, or the Edwards as property owners. The
lender was at all times fully familiar with the Edwards' interest as it had accepted
payments from them for may years and had regularly corresponded with them over the
amounts due under the note and trust deed. Interestingly, it was this failure to provide
such notice that formed the basis of the trial court's decision to deny AIM therightto
foreclose in the first suit.
During the trial of the second case, the court excluded certain evidence offered by
AIM as to its attorney fees incurred for a year in advance of the trial, as AIM had failed
to furnish the Edwards with copies of its monthly attorney billing records as previously
ordered by the court and in violation of the discovery rules.
AIM took this appealfromthe trial court's exclusion of its evidence regarding
certain of its attorney fees. The Edwards thereupon cross appealedfromthe District
Court's order awarding AIM its attorney fees and costs in both the prior and the instant
case.
II.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A fairly extensive statement of the facts is set forth in the original brief of
appellee/appellant. The salient facts may be summarized from appellee's original brief as
2

follows:
In 1981, James and Beverly Rothey purchased the home at 4695 Burch Creek
Drive, South Ogden, Utah, and financed the purchase by executing a trust deed and note
in favor of Mountain West Savings & Loan. Rotheys thereafter in 1983 sold the home to
Michael Flynn, who assumed the trust deed. Mountain West then went into federal
receivership and the Resolution Trust Corporation sold the trust deed and note to
American Interstate Mortgage (AIM).
In 1992, a judgment creditor of Flynn, Nut and Bolt Supply, had the home sold *
sheriffs sale where it was purchased by Judgment Collection Systems, which then
assigned its interest in the property to James and Helen Edwards, husband and wife.
After the redemption period, the sheriff issued his deed to the Edwards. The Edwards
then leased the home to their son and property manager, Bruce, who has remained in
possession of the property since that time.
The Edwards did not contractually assume the trust deed, but acquired the
property subject to the trust deed and note then owned by AIM. Upon acquiring the
property, the Edwards paid substantial amounts to AIM to catch up on payments and late
fees left delinquent by Flynn, and thereafter made monthly payments to AIM for several
years. During this time, certain disputes arose between the note holder and the Edwards'
son and agent regarding amounts required to bring the note current. Numerous requests
and demands were made by the lender that were later found by the trial court to be
"highly contradictory of each other and inconsistent." These demands, along with a
3

threat of foreclosure, required Bruce Edwards to seek an injunction preventing a trustee's
sale of the property. AIM counterclaimed seeking judicial foreclosure, but this relief was
denied due to its failure to give the notices and opportunity to cure mandated by the
contract documents. At trial, the court ordered Edwards to pay two missing payments of
$605.28 each and ruled that AIM was "precluded as a matter of equity from receiving the
substantial sums" it sought. Neither party appealed from thatfinaljudgment.
In this, the second action, AIM started out by sending notice to Flynn, Bruce
Edwards, and others of its intent to seek default and opportunity to cure, as required
under the note. In this notice, the lender demanded payment of delinquent payments and,
that it receive $19,930.20, the attorney fees and costs that it was denied in the first case.
After James and Helen Edwards were substituted for Bruce Edwards, the District Court
reversed its position and determined that AIM could recover such reasonable attorney
fees that it failed to recover in the first suit. Helen Edwards died shortly after the trial of
this case and James Edwards died after taking this appeal. Their son, agent, and tenant in
the property, Bruce C. Edwards was appointed by order of the Second Judicial District
Court of Davis County as personal representative of the Estate of James Wesley Edwards
and substituted as appellee/cross appellant herein by order of the Utah Supreme Court.
Contrary to the assertions of AIM in its last brief, Michael Flynn never waived any
notices or contractual rights under AIM's note and trust deed, and the lender refers the
court to no portion of the record where he did so, orally or otherwise. AIM makes
reference only to a statement of its counsel to the court that Flynn and other named
4

defendants had not filed answers to the complaint (R. at 700, at p.3).
It should also be noted that following the entry of thefinaljudgment dated
September 20, 2000, James Edwards paid to AIM all sums ordered in order to avoid the
foreclosure sale of his home (R. at 702, p.39).
III.
ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF THE ESTATE'S CROSS APPEAL
A. The Trial Court Erred in Allowing Judicial Foreclosure Based on Defective
Notice.
As noted herein, the Rotheys purchased the South Ogden home in 1981, and
signed the subject note and trust deed as "borrower." In 1983, the Rotheys sold the home
to Michael Flynn, and assigned to him their interest in the property and the financing
documents. Mr. Flynn also signed an assumption agreement with the lender, Mountain
West Savings. Thereafter, in 1992, a judgment creditor executed upon the home and it
was sold at sherifFs sale to Judgment Collection Systems, which in turn assigned its
interest to James and Helen Edwards. After the redemption time expired, the sheriff
delivered his sherifFs deed to the Edwards. Based on this chronology, AIM now asserts
that the Edwards have no standing to insist upon its performance of the obligations
contained in the note and trust deed.
Utah appellate courts have previously addressed the interest of a purchaser at an
execution sale. In Clawson v. Moesser, 535 P.2d 77, 78 (Utah 1975) the Utah Supreme
Court noted:
5

There can be no difference in the interest of one who loses his land to a
judgment creditor on execution and one who voluntarily parts with his title
by deed.

More recently, the Supreme Court observed that the purchaser at a sheriffs sale has the
substantive right to have the perfected title to the property following the redemption
period. Houston v. Lewis, 818 P.2d 531 (Utah 1991). Similarly, this court determined in
the case of Basin Loans, Inc. v. Young, 764 P.2d 239, 240 (Utah App. 1988):
[A] buyer at a sheriffs sale acquired "only such interest as the judgment debtor
had in the property sold." Citing Romero v. State, 642 P.2d 172 (N.M. 1982).
It follows that if the interest of the judgment debtor is encumbered by a lien, the
buyer takes subject to that lien.
From the foregoing authority, it must be concluded that the buyer at a sheriffs sale
obtains the identical interest that his judgment debtor held in the property, to the same
extent as though deeded or assigned by that debtor. In fact, Rule 69(7), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, specifically requires;
Upon a sale of real property the officer shall give the purchaser a certificate of
sale containing:
(D) a statement to the effect that all right, title, interest and claim of the judgment
debtor in and to the property is conveyed to the purchaser, provided that where
such sale is subject to redemption that fact shall be stated also.
Were the rule otherwise, the value of the execution process would be seriously
undermined. If, as the case law indicates, the buyer obtains the same rights at sheriffs
sale as he would have acquired by assignment or quit claim deed, then the Edwards
acquired the same interest in the home as detailed in Utah Code Ann, Section 57-1-13:
6

A quitclaim deed when executed as required by law shall have the effect of a
conveyance of all right, title, interest, and estate of the grantor in and to the
premises therein described and all rights, privileges, and appurtenances
thereunto belonging, at the date of the conveyance.
The Edwards therefore obtained all right, title, and interest of Mr. Flynn in the home,
subject only to the security interest of the lender as described and detailed in the note and
trust deed. See 33 C. J. S. Executions, Section 291.
Knowing that the Edwards, by operation of law, stood in the shoes of their
predecessor Flynn, AIM thereafter allowed the new owners to catch up on all delinquent
monthly payments and for several years thereafter accepted payments, maintained
correspondence, and in all ways treated the Edwards as the owners of the property and
the "borrower" under the note and trust deed. Based on this conduct alone, AIM would
be equitably estopped from denying Edwards the standing to insist on performance of the
terms of the note and trust deed. In, Trolley Square Associates v. Nielson, 886 P.2d 61
(Utah App. 1994), this court described the necessary elements of equitable estoppel as:
(1) a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one party inconsistent with a
claim later asserted; (2) reasonable action or inaction by the other party taken
on the basis of the first party's statement, admission, act, or failure to act; and
(3) injury to the second party that would result from allowing the first party to
contradict or repudiate such statement, admission, act, or failure to act.
As all of these conditions are met under the facts of this case, in that the lender at all
times treated the Edwards as though they stood in the shoes of Flynn, the lender cannot
now be heard to claim that the Edwards had not assumed the debt or somehow are not the
7

"borrower." To find otherwise would grant an unfair advantage to the lender. Masters v.
Worsley, 111 P.2d 499 (Utah App. 1989).
In any case, AIM not only treated the Edwards and their manager, Bruce Edwards,
as its borrower, but when it sought to foreclose on the security, it actually prepared and
delivered the notice mandated by the promissory note to Bruce Edwards. The problem,
however, was that this notice, while given, was materially defective. By improperly
demanding $19,390.20, its attorney fees denied in the previous action, the lender
effectively denied to the borrower any meaningful opportunity to cure. This chance to
remedy and cure, is the obvious purpose and goal of the notice requirement. The notice
requirement of the note is not unduly burdensome, but simply requires:
If I do not pay the full amount of each monthly payment on time, the Note
Holder may send me a written notice telling me that if I do not pay the
overdue amount by a certain time I will be in default. That date must be at
least 30 days after the date on which the notice is mailed to me.
The attorney fees demanded under the terms of the trust deed, that were denied to the
lender in prior litigation, simply do not constitute any part of "the overdue amount"
specified in the note.
Interestingly, AIM does not challenge the fact that it gave the Edwards, and others,
notice of the default and right to cure in an attempt to comply with the note. It only
assets that it was not required to give the notice to the Edwards. It's logic continues that
if it did not have to give Edwards any notice in the first instance, then it should not matter

8

that the notice it actually gave was materially defective and insufficient. AIM then
overlooks the fact that the same notice it gave to the Edwards was also given to Mr.
Flynn. A proper and effective notice was never furnished to any party, regardless of
whom AIM considered to be its "borrower." Furthermore, while the lender claims in its
statement of facts that Flynn somehow waived the requirement of a proper notice, its only
support is a reference to the record where its counsel tells the court that Flynn failed to
answer the complaint. Allowing entry of default is not the same thing as a knowing and
intentional relinquishment of a known right. Moreover, nowhere does the lender explain
why a proper notice delivered to Edwards predecessor would not have been a benefit to
the Edwards, or would not have been forwarded to the Edwards in the ordinary course of
affairs.
In support of its claim that no notice need be given the Edwards, the lender directs
the court's attention to Johnson v. Austin, 748 P.2d 1084 (Utah 1988). In Johnson, the
seller under a uniform real estate contract sought to foreclose the contract as a mortgage.
The trial court dismissed the action for failure to give written notice of default of the
contract andrightto cure to subsequent purchasers under the contract. The Utah
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the seller need not give such notice to the
subpurchasers as "no such clause [requiring notice of default andrightto cure] is found in
the acceleration provision" of the subject real estate contract. Johnson accordingly stands
for the proposition that when the giving of notice of default andrightto cure is not
9

required under the terms of the contract, it need not be given. In the language of the
court:
Therefore, we hold that acceleration provisions in uniform real estate contracts
should be interpreted according to the terms of the contract itself....
Accordingly, notice of default and a reasonable time to cure the default are not
required unless the parties agree to such terms or absence of such notice and
time to cure would be unconscionable. Johnson, at 1089.
This is much different than suggesting that notices specifically required under the terms
of a trust deed note need never be given to subsequent owners of the property. Unlike the
case in Johnson, the Edwards in this case were the subsequent owners of real property,
standing directly in the same legal position as their predecessor, Flynn, not the
subpurchasers under a uniform real estate contract. Moreover, the promissory note here
in issue expressly required that notice of default and opportunity to cure be given. The
contract in Johnson contained no such term.
AIM next assets that the Edwards, even though their position is legally identical to
their predecessor Flynn, lack standing to insist upon strict compliance with the note
terms. In support of this view, it refers the court to Garland v. Fleischmann, 831 P.2d
107, (Utah 1992). In Garland, the Utah Supreme Court reviewed the decision of this
court quieting title to real property against a party claiming ownership through a sheriff's
deed. The Supreme Court affirmed this court's order quieting the title against the grantee
of the sheriffs deed because the judgment debtor had no interest in the property at the
time of the execution sale. In dicta, the court observed that the claimant had no standing
10

to challenge an "oral modification of the earnest money agreement" substituting one
building lot for another, where she was not a party to the agreement, and both contracting
parties admitted and acknowledged the agreement. Even this dicta, however, is a long
wayfromholding that a purchaser of real property at execution sale has no right to insist
upon performance of a note and trust deed constituting a lien on the property. Further, in
the instant case, neither the actual contracting party, Rotheys, or their assignee Flynn,
ever claimed that they received a proper default notice or that they ever knowingly
waived it. Garland is therefore of little help to the lender in this case.
Accordingly, since the lender never gave a proper notice of default and a 30 day
opportunity to cure, as required under the subject promissory note, it simply was not
entitled to the remedy of foreclosure. The judgment of the District Court to the contrary
was in error.
B. The Trial Court Erred in Allowing AIM Attorney Fees for Protecting its Interest
as Allowed Under the Trust Deed When it Failed to Comply with the Trust Deed.
Paragraph 7 of the subject trust deed signed by the Rotheys contains the fairly
standard language:
If Borrower fails to perform the covenants and agreements contained in this
Deed of Trust, or if any action or proceeding is commenced which materially
affects Lender's interest in the Property,... then Lender at Lender's option,
upon notice to Borrower, may make such appearances, disburse such sums and
take such action as is necessary to protect Lender's interest; including, but not
limited to, disbursement of reasonable attorney's fees . . . (emphasis added).
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AIM relies on the foregoing term of the trust deed as the basis for its claim of
attorney fees in the instant action and the prior suit. Indeed, this provision was obviously
intended to allow a lender the right to recoup its reasonable attorney fees when it is
required to take action due to the default of the borrower or to protect its interest in the
trust property. Importantly however, this right is specifically conditioned upon the lender
first giving notice to the borrower. The obvious import of such language is that the
borrow should first be given an opportunity to cure any default or eliminate any
proceeding that adversely threatens the lender's security. No such advance notice was
given by AIM to the Edwards, or their agent, in this or in the initial lawsuit. No such
notice was given to the Edwards' predecessors, Rotheys or Flynn. No claim is even
asserted by the lender that such notice was given to anyone or affirmatively waived. AIM
claims simply that the Edwards were not the "borrower" and that therefore, no notice was
necessary. Without explaining why the Edwards would not have benefitted from a proper
notice given even to their predecessors, AIM again asserts on the authority of Johnson v
Austin, 748 P.2d 1084 (Utah 1988) and Garland v. Fleischmann, 831 P.2d 107 (Utah
1992), that it need not give the contractual protections agreed to by its predecessor,
Mountainwest Savings and Loan, to subsequent owners of the property encumbered by
the security. As earlier discussed, no such support can be found in the case law. Indeed,
a fair reading of Johnson simply demonstrates that terms and conditions contractually
agreed upon must be performed.
12

The lender does not question that it would have been required to give advance
notice and therightto cure before it could recover attorney fees from Mr. Flynn. It
simply assets that owing to the fortuitity of the property ownership passing from Flynn to
another at the sheriffs sale, that it is somehow relieved of this and other terms of the
agreements. It overlooks the fact, that under Utah Code Ann., Section 57-1-13, the
Edwards are legally identical to Flynn, having acquired "all right, title, interest, and estate
of the grantor" Flynn. This effectively places the buyer at an execution sale in privity of
contract with the judgment debtor, or at least in sufficient privity as to insist on
performance of the contract documents that define and condition the lender's lien. This
occurs by operation of law to the same extent as through Flynn assigned the note and
trust deed to the Edwards. Clawson v. Moesser, 535 P.2d 77 (Utah 1975). Were it
otherwise, one could never involuntarily acquire a judgment debtor's contractrights,by
sheriffs sale, bankruptcy, or otherwise, as the obligations and duties of the lender would
change with each transfer of ownership. In such instances, however, the law mandates
that the prior lien is unaffected by the execution sale and the new buyer takes the
property subject to all terms and conditions of the existing lien. 33 C. J. S., Executions,
Section 297. The District Court therefore erred in relieving the lender of its obligation of
giving prior notice of its intent to incur attorney fees which it would seek to add to its lien
interest.
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C. The Lender Lacked the Right to Accelerate the Payment of the Note Balance
Under the Terms of the Trust Deed.
In its response, the lender claims that it was required under the note and trust deed
to provide notice of default and notice of acceleration only to its original borrower or to
person directly assuming the obligations of the contract documents. In the notice of
default actually given by AIM, a copy of which is annexed hereto as Exhibit "A," it seeks
the acceleration of the principal balance asserting "that there has occurred a sale or
transfer of the property or an interest therein without Lender's prior written consent and
which transfer or sale was not an enumerated exclusion." AIM, however, mistakenly
overlooks the fact that under the express language of the trust deed, it lacked the right to
accelerate the maturity of the debt due to a transfer of the property by judicial
enforcement of a judgment lien. Paragraph 17 of the trust deed provides:
If all or any part of the Property or an interest therein is sold or transferred
by Borrower without Lender's prior written consent, excluding (a) the
creation of a lien or encumbrance subordinate to this Deed of Trust...
Lender may at Lender's option, declare all the sums secured by this Deed
of Trust to be immediately due and payable.
Under the facts of this case, Bolt and Nut Supply, a creditor of the borrower Flynn,
obtained judgment against Flynn. Upon entry, this judgment created a lien on the
property subordinate to the deed of trust. When the property was sold at sheriff sale, a
transfer of the property to the Edwards occurred by virtue of the "creation of a lien or
encumbrance subordinate" to the trust deed. The involuntary sale of the property by
14

operation of law is therefore one of the "enumerated exclusions" to the contract
requirement that the lender give its prior written consent to a sale or transfer of the
property. Accordingly, since the consent of the lender is not necessary for a transfer due
to the creation of a lien, it does not follow that AIM can somehow ignore the transfer and
continue to treat Flynn as its borrower. The effectiveness of the lender's default is thus
ineffective to accelerate the maturity balance. Further, even if the trust deed terms did
not exempt this transfer from the need of the lender's consent, such a due on sale clause
could not be enforced under applicable Utah statute. Utah Code Ann., Section 57-15-2
D. The District Court Erred in Granting Attorney Fees That Were Barred Under
the Doctrines of Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel.
Possibly the most significant aspect of the present litigation, is the allowance by
the trial court of relief to a litigant that was specifically denied in prior litigation from
which no appeal was taken. Specifically, as part of the judgment entered below, the
District Court included $21,072.25 "Fees and costs of $17,346.25 incurred (from the
Durbano Law Firm) protecting the lender's interest from January 28, 1998 to July 20,
2001." This sum includes the attorney fees, court costs, and interest incurred by AIM in
the first lawsuit of Bruce C. Edwards v. American Interstate Mortgage, Civil No.
94090043 8CN. In its counterclaim seeking judicial foreclosure, AIM pled and offered
proof at trial of these same legal fees. Owing to the conduct and behavior of the lender,
these fees were denied. In its January 28, 1998 decision, the trial court ordered:
15

By their own conduct they are precluded as a matter of equityfromreceiving
the substantial sums they seek. The record is replete with examples of
conflicting statements as to what was owned. It would be grossly unfair to
require Mr. Edwards to pay penalties including interest when the demands
made upon him were so highly contradictory of each other and inconsistent.
If equity precluded AIMfromrecovering the fees and costs it sought in the first case, it is
difficult to see how those equities could have changed in the instant case. It is difficult to
see why this litigant should be given two bites at the same apple.
The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, often referred to as claim
preclusion or issue preclusion have long been recognized a part of the law of this state.
Basically, these doctrines constitute rules of finality by preventing the relitigation of
claims and issues previously put to rest by judicial decision. These doctrines also serve
the goal of judicial efficiency and are often collectively referred to as res judicata.
Penrodv. Nu Creation Creme, Inc. 699 P.2d 873 (Utah 1983); Copper State Thrift &
Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387 (Utah App. 1987).
Recent cases, observe that the doctrine of res judicata is comprised of two separate
branches, namely, (1) claim preclusion, and (2) collateral estoppel or issue preclusion.
Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407 (Utah App. 1990). The first branch of res judicata,
presently known as claim preclusion, bars the relitigation of claims that have been
previously litigated by the same parties or their privies of a claim for relief previously
resolved by afinaljudgment on the merits. Trimble Real Estate vs. Monte Vista Ranch9
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758 P.2d 45 (Utah App. 1988). Additionally, the Trimble court noted:
"The same rule also prevents relitigation of claims that could and should have
been litigated in the prior action, but were not." Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme,
Inc., 669 P.2d 875. Under claim preclusion, the judgment is final and serves
as the full measure for relief to be accorded between the same parties on the
same claim or cause of action. Trimble at 453.
In the first action between the parties, Bruce C. Edwards v. American Interstate
Mortgage, the lender sought its legal fees incurred in defending plaintiffs request for
injunctive relief and for pursuing its counterclaim seeking judicial foreclosure. At trial,
AIM offered evidence that it had incurred $19,930.20 in attorney fees and associated
costs, and sought a judgment for these expenses. These are the same legal fees that AIM
demanded in its notice of default, and are the same fees later awarded in the instant case.
The parties were the same in the prior case, as in the matter under appeal. Further, the
plaintiff in the first action was a privy of his parents, James and Helen Edwards, and
occupied the relationships of agent and principal, tenant and landlord, and throughout
both cases occupied and possessed the property in dispute. He now acts as personal
representative of the Estate of James Edwards. The first action similarly resulted in a
final judgment wherein the court denied attorney fees to both parties and ruled that AIM
was "precluded as a matter of equityfromreceiving the substantial sums they seek."
Moreover, even if the lender had not sought is legal fees in the first action, the claim
would now be precluded as such a claim is one that "could and should have been
litigated" in the first lawsuit. SMP, Inc. v. Kirkman, 843 P.2d 531 (Utah App. 1992);
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Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407 (Utah App. 1990); Masters v. Worsley, 111 P.2d 499
(Utah App. 1989); and Copper State Thrift and Loan v. Buruno, 735 P.2d 387 (Utah App.
1987). Therefore, since AIM had its day in court on the attorney fee claim, and took no
appealfromthefinaljudgment denying that claim, it is now barred by res judicata or
claim preclusion from now seeking another bite at the apple.
Similar to the doctrine of res judicata is that of collateral estoppel, or issue
preclusion. This court, in the case of Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, 758
P.2d 451 (Utah App. 1988), described this doctrine as follow:
Under this doctrine, the relitigation of factual issues that have once been
litigated and decided is precluded even if the claim for relief in the two actions
are different. Penrodv. Nu Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d 875, and even if
only the party against whom the doctrine is asserted was a party or in privity
with a party to the prior adjudication. Copper State Thrift & Loan v. Bruno,
735 P.2d at 390 (emphasis in original).
It should be noted, that this doctrine will bar relitigation even if different parties are
involved, provided that the party "against whom" the doctrine is asserted was a party to
the prior action. There is no dispute that AIM was a defendant and counterclaimant in
the prior suit and is present as party plaintiff in the present case. Robertson v. Campbell,
674 P.2d 1226 (Utah 1983).
In Trimble, the court then went on to approve the test set forth in Searle Brothers
v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 691 (Utah 1978) to determine if collateral estoppel applies.
(1) Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical with the one
presented in the action in question?
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(2) Was there afinaljudgment on the merits?
(3) Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a party or in privity with
a party to the prior adjudication?
(4) Was the issue in the first case completely, fully, and fairly litigated?
A comparison of the first suit of Bruce C. Edwards v. American Interstate Mortgage with
the present case of American Interstate v. Michael E. Flynn and others (including Bruce
C. Edwards, James Edwards, Helen Edwards, and Bruce C. Edwards as personal
representative of the Estate of James Edwards) will quickly reveal that American
Interstate Mortgage (AIM), the party against whom the bar is sought, was a party in both
actions. Bruce C. Edwards, agent and tenant of his parents was present in both cases.
The issue, namely, whether the lender has reasonably incurred and is entitled to recover
its legal fees in the first suit, is identical in both actions. In the first suit, this claim could
have been raised, should have been raised, and in fact was raised by AIM, and the relief
was denied after being fully and completely litigated to the trial court. This issue of
attorney fees is therefore barred by collateral estoppel. Having lost on this issue in the
first action, the lender is not entitled to a second bite in this, the second case. The trial
court was mistaken in its interpretation that collateral estoppel did not bar relitigation of
the same attorney fees issue. This error was obviously prejudicial to the Edwards. The
District Court's award of attorney fees from the first suit must therefore be reversed.
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IV.
ARGUMENT IN OPPOSITION TO APPELLANT'S APPEAL
A. The Trial Court Properly Denied AIM Attorney Fees for Failure to Comply
With the Court's Order and the Applicable Discovery Rules.
During the presentation of the lender's case in chief, objection was made to the
admission of AIM's attorney billing records for a period of approximately one year prior
to the trial of the matter. This objection was based upon the lender's failure to have
provided these records to the Edwards during the pretrial discovery. These records were
requested on multiple occasions by the Edwards through formal discovery requests, and
AIM's failure to properly respond required that a trial date be stricken and the entry of an
order compelling such discovery. Specifically, on July 7, 1999, the District Court entered
the following orders:
IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED, ORDERED, AND DECREED that the plaintiff
shall be and is hereby ordered to fully answer and comply with the defendant's
Request for Production of Documents and Interrogatories served by defendant
Edwards....
IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED, ORDERED, AND DECREED that the trial
date heretofore set in the matter for the 27th of July, 1999, shall be and is
hereby stricken. The matter shall not be reset for trial until discovery by the
parties has been completed and additional parties have been joined consistent
with this order.
In spite of the repeated request of the Edwards and the foregoing court orders, for a
period of a year prior to the trial, AIM failed and refused to make its attorney billing
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records available, even though they had been provided for past periods of time, and even
though the Edwards had repeatedly requested that discovery be supplemented as further
records became available. As a consequence of AIM's conduct, the court properly
entered an order under Rule 37(b)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, prohibiting the
introduction of the missing records into evidence.
Despite several requests and the orders of the court, AIM protests the trial court's
rejection of the proposed evidence claiming that it was not required under the version of
Rule 26, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in effect at the time of trial. Remarkably, AIM
raises this issue for the first time on appeal, as the issue was never brought to the
attention of the District Court. Indeed, the lender does not seriously argue that the matter
was preserved in the record for appeal. In Shire Development v. Frontier Investments,
799 P.2d 221 (Utah App. 1990) this court observed:
We have reiterated many times, we will not consider an issue raised on appeal
for the first time. Citing with approval Heiner v. S. J. Groves & Sons Co., 790
P.2dl07 (Utah App. 1990); Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938 (Utah 1987).
In response to the obvious failure to have presented this issue to the trial court,
AIM now assets that the District Court's failure to have considered the effective date of
the rule constitutes plain error, and as such may be raised initially on appeal. The plain
error rule is found at Rule 103 (d), Utah Rules of Evidence, and provides as follows:
Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain error affecting substantial
rights although they were not brought to the attention of the court.
21

Here, the lender is not asserting any significant or "substantial" right or constitutional
protection, but simply argues about which version of a rule of discovery applies in a civil
case. As noted by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 35 (Utah
1989):
The first requirement for a finding of plain error is that the error be "plain."
i.e., from our examination of the record, we must be able to say that is should
have been obvious to a trial court that it was committing error.
The second and somewhat interrelated requirement for the finding of plain
error is that the error affect the substantial right of the accused, i.e. that the
error be harmful.
Clearly, the date that a new or amended discovery rule comes into effect is not something
that is so obvious that the trial court should have known that it was committing error.
Since the matter was never raised, it was not obvious to the two counsel representing the
lender or the lender's own president, himself a lawyer. Since it involves neither
substantial rights or was obvious to the court, this claim must be rejected and the court's
denial of the evidence must be affirmed. Should this court determine otherwise, then at a
minimum the matter should be remanded to the District Court with suitable instructions,
as the Edwards never had an opportunity to fully challenge or cross examination with
respect to this excluded evidence.
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V.
CONCLUSION
In seeking the remedy of judicial foreclosure of its trust deed, AIM was required
under the terms of its note and applicable Utah law to give advance notice to the Edwards
and their predecessors in interest of the claimed default and to allow an opportunity to
cure of not less than 30 days. The clear purpose of this provision was for the protection
of the land owner and their interest in the real property. Despite the requirement of the
note and the law, a proper notice was never given. While AIM did indeed provide notice
in an attempt to comply with such legal requirements, the notice actually given was
defective as it wrongly demanded payment of attorney fees that were not part of the
amounts owing under the note or properly required to bring the note current. Moreover,
it is no defense to the lender to claim that since the Edwards were not the original
borrower, no notice need be provided to them, and as its logic assumes, a faulty notice
must be overlooked.
Again, the trust deed itself required that should the lender wish to engage legal
counsel to remedy a default or take action to protect the security, and in turn recover such
sumsfromthe property held as security, it must first give notice to the property owner.
The property owner, or borrower would then have an opportunity to cure the default or
challenge to the security. This notice was never given by the lender. Indeed, unlike the

23

default under the note, the lender never even attempted to give such notice to the Edwards
or any of their predecessors. Because of the failure of AIM to follow and comply with
the requirements of its own note and trust deed, it claim for attorney fees and costs in
both the past and present cases must be denied. The trial court erred under applicable
statutory and case law in relieving AIM of its performance requirements.
Most significantly, the trial court erred in the application of the long recognized
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel by allowing the lender to receive an
award of attorney fees for legal services incurred in a prior case where it was specifically
denied this relief, and where it took no appeal. Under either of these common law
doctrines, the attorney fees sought in the first lawsuit would clearly be barred.
Lastly, the trial court was correct in property refusing evidence of attorney fees
where such evidence was wrongly withheld from the Edwards contrary to established
civil rules of discovery and in clear violation of the express order of the court.
For these reasons, the Edwards respectfully request that this court reverse the final
judgment of the District Court and vacate the entire award of attorney fees and court costs
granted along with the remedy of foreclosure. In the alternative, the Edwards request, at
minimum that the attorney fees claimedfromthe first litigation be disallowed and
strickenfromthe judgment. The Edwards similarly request that the judgment of the
District Court denying the admission of certain billing records of the lender be affirmed
as a just and proper exercise of the trial court's discretion.
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Respectfully submitted this 30 day of October, 2001

DA(yiD/. KNOWLTC
Attorney for Appellee/Cross Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
Certify mailing two true and correct copy of the foregoing to David J. Jordan,
Attorney for Appellant American Interstate Mortgage, 201 South Main Street, 1100, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84111-4904 this 30th day of Octobei^2O01, posgjge prepaM.

25

ADDENDUM

Demand Letter of September 16, 2001 from Attorney Douglas M. Durbano

v,

LAYTON OFFICE
476 W. Heritage Park Blvd. • Suiie 200
Layton. Utah 84041

Telephone: (801) 776-41II
Fax:(801)776-1121

DURBANO
IAAWFIRM

3340 Hamson Blvd. • Suite 110
Ogden. Utah 84403
Telephone: (801) 621-4111
Fax: (801)776-112!
Reply to Layton Office

September 16, 1998
VIA CERTIFIED AND REGULAR MAIL
Michael E. Flynn
c/o 4695 Burch Creek Drive
South Ogden, Utah 84403

Michael E. Flynn
4136 Sunny side Cemetary Road
Stevensville, MT 59870

Occupant
4695 Burch Creek Drive
South Ogden, Utah 84403

Micliaei E. Fly:in
817 Leese Lane
Stevensville, MT 59870

Re:

$79,000.00 Note secured by Real Property located at
4695 Burch Creek Drive, South Ogden, Utah 84403
All of Lot 2 Crowther Subdivision, in South Ogden
City, Weber County, Utah, according to the official
plat thereof

To Michael E. Flynn and wnom it May Concern:
Notice is hereby given that DOUGLAS M. DURBANO, ESQ., is the duly appointed
Successor TRUSTEE under that certain Trust Deed made, and delivered by James M. Rothey and
Beverly Rothey, Husband and Wife, sold to and assumed by MICHAEL E. FLYNN, as TRUSTOR(S)
to Mountain West Savings and Loan, as TRUSTEE on August 28, 1981, covering certain real
property therein and hereinbefore described to secure certain obligations in favor of Mountain West
Savings and Loan, as BENEFICIARY(IES), which Trust Deed was duly recorded on September 3,
1981, as Entry No. 843044, in Book 1388, at Page 1567, in the official records of Weber County,
State of Utah, which beneficial interest was assigned to American Interstate Mortgage Corporation
on July 31, 1991, a breach of the obligation for which the aforesaid trust property was conveyed as
security has occurred in that default has been made as follows:
1.

Failure to make monthly payments in the amount of $700.65, due on the first day of
each of the months of December, 1997, January, February, March, April, May, June,
July, August and September, 1998, totaling $7,006.50. This amount must be paid in
not less than thirty (30) days from this notice, plus any other first of the month
payment which may come due during this thirty (30) day period.

2.

Failure to pay a late charge of 4% ($236.20) on each of the overdue payments not
received by the 15th of each month identified above. Tliis amount must be paid in not
less than thirty (30) days from this notice, plus any other late charge due on any
overdue payment not received by the 15th of the month wliich may come due during
such thirty (30) day period.

September 16, 1998
Page Two

3.

That the lenders security or interest in the property has become impaired due to the
bankruptcy of the debtor, abandonment of the property by the debtor, legal actions
filed by Bruce Edwards against the lender relating to his possessory interest in the
subject property requiring Lender, pursuant to % 6 (D) and % 7 of the Trust Deed, to
make disbursements including costs and reasonable attorney fees in the amount of
$19,930.20 to protect Lenders interest. This amount is hereby declared due and
payable within thirty (30) days of the date of this notice, plus interest thereon at the
rate payable on the outstanding principal under the Note.

4.

That there has occurred a sale or transfer of the property or an interest therein without
Lender's prior written consent and which transfer or sale was not an enumerated
exclusion. Therefore, Lender hereby exercises its option, pursuant to % 3 of the Note
and U 17 if the Trust Deed, to declare all sums secured by the Deed of Trust to be
immediately due and payable. Borrower shall have, and is hereby given notice, that
Borrower has thirty (30) daysfromthe date of this notice and its mailing within which
to pay in full all sums secured by the Note and Deed of Trust. The exact sum secured
by the Note and Trust Deed may be obtainedfromthe Lender by contacting its Trustee
at the above address and requesting in writing the payoff amount for any specific date
and time.

Borrower must pay in full all the amounts due, as detailed in the Note and Trust Deed as
generally stated above plus all costs of this enforcement and collection effort, including reasonable
attorneys fees, within thirty (30) days of mailing of this notice. Failure to do so will result in the
immediatefilingof a foreclosure action, either judicial or non-judicial, in order to sell the property and
satisfy the amounts due, owed or otherwise secured by the Note and Trust Deed, if such proceeds of
sale are insufficient, to satisfy the obligations of the Note, Lender may collect the unsatisfied amounts
directly from the Borrower.
Govern yourselves accordingly.
Sincerely yours,
DURBANO LAW FIRM

Dougfs M. Durbano
Attorney at Law
Successor Trustee
DMD/asp

